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ABSTRACT

In 2006, the Chinese government released its first ever Africa policy paper. In the
document, the government of China announced its plans to forge a strong and enduring
relationship with Africa on the basis of four ideals: mutual tolerance despite differing
ideologies, cooperation in international politics, economic intercourse predicated upon
fairness, and observance of Africa’s right to choose its own path to economic
development.2 This document, along with the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(or FOCAC) (at which more than forty-five African leaders gathered to discuss the future
of China-Africa relations), served as a springboard for future Chinese engagement in
Africa.3 Four years later, in 2010, trade between China and Africa exceeded $120
billion.4 Nevertheless, China was not alone in its quest to build a presence in one of the
world’s largest and most populous continents. In April 2008, India, following in China’s
footsteps, held the first India-Africa summit in New Delhi, thus creating a new bond
between India and Africa. Subsequently, India unveiled a number of initiatives, including
a “$5.4 billion concessionary credit line over the next five years and duty-free access of
India’s total tariff lines, with a unilateral granting of preferential duty access to 9% of
India’s total tariff lines for Africa’s 34 least developed countries.”5 The purpose of this
paper is to examine the scope of “Chindia’s” recent engagement in Africa. As well, the
aim of this paper is to suggest that while countries in Africa should welcome aid from
Asian nations, they should also exercise their bargaining power to (1) limit or actively
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regulate infrastructure projects, (2) condemn the adoption of economic policies that
threaten their domestic markets, and (3) implore “Chindia” to help them address the
socioeconomic and public health challenges that inhibit long-term economic growth.
China in Africa
China’s interest in Africa began in the 1960s and 1970s, albeit this interest was
political and ideological.6 China’s recent interest in the continent is economic, with
particular attention given to the trade of natural resources such as minerals, land, wood,
metals and oil.7 Africa, with an estimated population close to one billion, also offers
China a huge market to both sell manufactured commodities and invest in.8 In addition,
considering the political and socioeconomic obstacles that afflict the continent, Africa
offers China an opportunity to provide aid and support, giving it political leverage and
allowing it to play a key role in international politics.
Over the past decade, China has become one of the fastest growing economies
in the world. However, to achieve such exponential growth, China has had to increase
its consumption of natural resources, which has resulted in a “resource deficit.”9 In
order to close this gap between domestic production and consumption of natural
resources, China has offered Africa’s major oil producers such as Angola, Sudan, and
Nigeria interest-free or low-interest loans and aid packages.10 In addition, China has
encouraged its companies to invest in Africa through creating the China-Africa
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Development Fund (CAD) and securing bilateral agreements with various African
nations.11 Owing to these initiatives, Chinese state owned enterprises (or SOEs) now
make considerable investments in the construction, agriculture, and extractive
(mining/oil) sectors of Sudan, the Republic of Congo, Chad, and Ethiopia.12 What is
more, in 2004, state-owned Sinopec, by offering a $2 billion aid package aimed at
constructing health, transportation, and education infrastructure, was able to secure
access to Angola’s oil fields.13 Equally noteworthy is that fifty-percent of China’s FDI
(foreign direct investment) now goes to Africa and has expanded to include apparel,
power generation, road construction, telecommunication, and tourism sectors.14
India in Africa
India, like China, is also one of the fastest growing economies in the world.
According to experts, India is expected to grow at an average rate of 8.4% per annum
until 2020 and will eclipse the United States in 2042.15 While a dearth of natural
resources prompted India to look to Africa, India’s current interest in the region is
largely rooted in a desire to both possess greater political clout and to ultimately
become a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. To achieve
this goal, India has adopted a “development” model to increase its presence in Africa.
For instance, in May 2011, at the second India-Africa Forum summit, the Indian
government revealed its plans to invest $700 million towards the construction of
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educational institutions throughout Africa.16 S ubsequent to this summit, numerous
Indian firms undertook large-scale infrastructure projects in Africa. For example, IRCON
secured a $31 million contract with Ethiopia to construct 120 kilometers of roads, built a
600-kilometer railway in Mozambique, and has established a presence in Zambia,
Sudan, and Nigeria.17 Similarly, the Tata Group built a vehicle assembly in Uganda and
an instant coffee plant in Zambia.18 Moreover, trade between India and Africa has risen
exponentially, from $3.39 billion in 2000 to $53 billion in 2010 and 2011.19 Trade
between both regions is expected to reach $75 billion by 2015.20
Problems with “Chindia” in Africa
Threat to Domestic Markets
“China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the
essence of colonialism.” – Lamido Sanusi, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria21
Notwithstanding the aforesaid feats, the recent and ever-growing presence of
Indian firms and Chinese state-owned-enterprises in Africa should be regarded with
great caution. Besides creating only a handful of jobs and eliminating existing jobs, Asian
firms, especially those involved in the production of footwear and clothing, threaten the
livelihood of local manufacturing firms in Africa. For instance, a study of 96 domestic
firms in Ethiopia found that imports of cheap, low-cost, Chinese goods caused 28% of
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these companies go bankrupt and 32% of them to downsize.22 As well, China and India
export a higher number of electronics, medical supplies, and machines to Africa than
does Africa to both nations. 23 This trade imbalance owes in large part to the
protectionist trade policies that both China and India have adopted against goods from
African countries.24
Human Rights Violations and Other Illegal Activities
In addition, “Chindia’s” presence in Africa has also engendered gross human
rights violations and a whole host of other illegal activities. For instance, in Zambia, a
copper-abundant sub-Saharan African nation, there exist numerous Chinese-owned
coppers mines that regularly violate safety regulations. According to a Human Rights
Watch report, Chinese owners of these mines actively refuse to provide African miners
with sufficient protective gear and safe working conditions. 25 What is worse, the
Zambian miners who challenged these deplorable conditions in 2011 were met with
gunshots from Chinese supervisors who claimed that the shots were fired in selfdefense.26 As well, the Chinese government has also adopted measures to ensure that it
exclusively reaps the benefits of its engagement in Africa. According to some reports,
tax avoidance, on the part of China (and other foreign investors), has and continues to
cost Zambia about $2 billion per annum in lost revenue.27

22

“China’s Growing Role in Africa: Myths and Facts,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
February 9, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/ieb/2012/02/09/china-s-growing-role-in-africa-myths-andfacts/9j5q (accessed November 25, 2013).
23
Broadman, “China and India Go to Africa: New Deals in the Developing World,” 97-98.
24
Ibid, 96.
25
Okeowo, “China in Africa: The New Imperialists,” The New Yorker, June 12, 2013.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.

6

Although Indian firms do not share the same human rights record as Chinese-owned
corporations, they are nevertheless culpable of engaging in illicit business practices.
According to Transparency International’s 2006 Bribe Payers Index, India has the most
businesses that pay bribes while working overseas.28 This, of course, is ascribable to how
business is oftentimes conducted in Africa, especially in neo-patrimonial African
countries that are plagued by corruption.29 Even so, these practices help to maintain the
corrupt status quo and move African nations farther away from establishing true, and
not partial, democracies.
Slapdash Infrastructure Projects
Besides threatening local markets, committing gross human rights violations, and
engaging in illegal business practices, “Chindia” has been accused of failing to deliver on
its large-scale infrastructure projects. For instance, in 2006, the China Overseas
Engineering Group Corporation (COVEC) built an eighty thousand square meter hospital
in Luanda, Angola. This hospital, otherwise known as the General Hospital, cost $8
million and was the first public hospital to be built in Angola. Four years later, in June
2010, all medical personnel were forced to flee the hospital because it was on the verge
of collapse.30 Similarly, in March 2011, Chinese constructed roads from Luanda to the
Luanda provinces in northern Angola.31 By October, Chinese engineers were forced to
remove the tar from different parts of this road due to shoddy workmanship.32
The Unethical Policy of “Non-Interference”
28
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Perhaps the most contentious issue surrounding “Chindia’s” recent engagement
with Africa is the adoption of and stoic adherence to the policy of “non-interference.”33
This policy, which derives from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, prohibits
leaders from intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries. China, in order to
gain and maintain unfettered access to natural resources, has historically supported and
financed authoritarian regimes within Africa. What is worse, China is arguably
responsible for accelerating infighting between contesting groups, which was the case
with the conflict between northern Sudan and southern Sudan (now South Sudan).
Although India has not fully pursued a policy of “non-interference,” it is equally
culpable of putting commercial interests before the welfare of local communities.
Because India’s consumption of oil has risen considerably in the past decade, it has
looked to Africa for oil that is both high quality and abundant. However, this need for oil
to fuel its rapidly industrializing economy has caused India to overlook poor governance
to secure lucrative contracts. A paragon of such disregard was ONGC Videsh Limited’s
(OVL) decision to offer $750 million to obtain access to two Sudanese oil blocks that
were sold by a Canadian firm due to mounting evidence of human rights violations in
the region.34
Going Forward: Suggested African Response to Growing Asian Presence
While “Chindia’s” recent engagement in Africa does border on neo-imperialism,
it is quite distinct from previous European colonialism. The obvious difference is that
Africa is not under the absolute control of “Chindia.” Although “Chindia” is beginning to
33
34
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exercise economic leverage over Africa, there is still space for action. African nations
possess the wherewithal (and the natural resources) to shift the growing presence of
Asian firms in their favor. With that said, it is imperative that African nations, provided
that their governments are concerned with the interests of their citizens, formulate and
adopt an agenda to guide future “Chindia”-Africa relations.
Limit or Actively Regulate Infrastructure Projects
The first objective of this agenda should be to limit or actively regulate
infrastructure projects. African nations must require Asian firms desiring to build roads,
buildings, and roadways throughout Africa to designate a considerable amount of time
to such ventures. Because Africa is, for the most part, relatively new to large-scale and
advanced infrastructure, time must be dedicated to ensure that the roads, buildings,
and roadways that are built throughout the continent effectively withstand the test of
time. As well, African leaders must also encourage Asian firms to appoint local Africans
to oversight positions to ensure that the basic rights of African workers are respected.
Condemn Economic Policies that Threaten Domestic Markets
Besides monitor infrastructure projects, African governments must also interdict
Asian firms from adopting economic policies or engaging in business practices that
endanger local markets. Certainly, trade between Asian nations has played a crucial role
in strengthening Africa’s competitiveness in the global market. For instance, in addition
to metals, minerals, and fuels, “Chindia” has begun to import labor-intensive goods
from Africa, which are further processed in Asia and shipped to European nations and

9

the United States.35 At the same time, the importation of cheap goods from China and
India has reduced the demand for goods produced by local African manufacturers,
causing several African businesses to founder. The burden is now on African leaders
formulate policies to guide their dealings with “Chindia,” and such policies should
ensure the continent economic success both internally and in the global world. In
addition, African leaders must lift existing trade barriers against goods such as yarn,
textiles, and apparel from China and India.36 Such barriers increase production costs for
local African manufacturers and prices of African goods.
Ask “Chindia” to Assist in Poverty Alleviation and HIV/AIDs Prevention
It is common knowledge that Africa is home to some of the poorest people in the
world. According to experts, most Africans subsist on roughly 70 cents per day, placing
them far below the internationally accepted poverty line.37 Furthermore, despite the
tremendous growth that Africa is projected to experience in forthcoming decades, most
Africans will never consume more than $1.25 per day.38 As a result, African leaders are
tasked with increasing the purchasing power of their citizens. Instead of blindly
accepting aid from China and India, African nations must tailor this financial support to
meet their needs. African leaders must require Chinese and Indian firms to establish
training programs throughout Africa to help the continent develop a high-skilled and
consequently competitive labor force.
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The second threat to long-term economic growth in Africa is HIV/AIDs. According
to UNAIDs figures, Africa makes up 67% of HIV infections in the world. What is worse,
the virus is prevalent among infants and the working-age population (between 15 and
49 years-old), causing African nations to lose potential workers and witness a decline in
their existing workforces.39 Aid emanating from Asian nations to Africa must somehow
acknowledge the HIV/AIDs epidemic as a pressing issue. Certainly, achieving proper
HIV/AIDS education, medication, and prevention strategies require a concerted effort
from African nations and their foreign partners, but it is not a problem that can be left
unaddressed.
Conclusion
Owing to “Chindia’s” involvement, Africa has grown at a steady rate of 5.4%.40
However, such growth has been acquired at tremendous costs. China and India’s recent
engagement in the continent has given rise to human rights violations, numerous
slapdash infrastructure projects, regional conflicts, and other injustices. Nevertheless,
several African states have begun to recognize the power that exists in having an
abundance of natural resources. The Chadian government, for example, upon
discovering that Chinese firms dumped oil in numerous ditches throughout N’Djamena
and subsequently forced Chadian workers to attend to this oil spillage without
protective gear, suspended Chinese operations on its soil.41 Similarly, the government of
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Gabon, in an effort to avoid severe environmental degradation, has denied Chinese
SOEs access to its oil fields.42 All African states must heed the actions of both Chad and
Gabon. Failure to do so will allow “Chindia” to leave the imperial imprint that colonial
mammoths such as France and Great Britain left on the continent decades ago. Ordinary
Africans welcome aid, but would like reform to reap the benefits of foreign investment.
The people have spoken, now African leaders must listen.
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